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Abstract  
The smaller the world due to mass migration and new technology, the bigger the conflicts due to perceiving 
ourselves as more different from one-another than ever. There is new hope, however, because cosmopolitanism 
has made a spectacular comeback to save the day. Unfortunately, everyone seems to be so caught up arguing 
whether the glass of cosmopolitanism is half full or half empty, that cosmopolitanism is, in fact, causing quite a 
stir, thus defeating its harmonious purpose. This paper calls for a time-out and proposes a cosmopolitan-
approach to cosmopolitanism.  
   
Introduction  
Just as a Cosmopolitan cocktail is mistaken for a Martini due to the large cone-shaped glass 
in which it is served, the concept of cosmopolitanism is often mistaken for an elitist term 
referring to an impossible social representation characterized by rootlessness and the death of 
local as well as national identities. However, with the idea of cosmopolitanism being every 
bit as mouth-watering and refreshing as the cocktail, one cannot help but indulge in it. After 
all, what intellectual visionary would favour a narrow and local outlook over a more worldly 
one encompassing global responsibilities? Who would not want to be a citizen of the world? 
Certainly not Barack Obama, who is one of the first politicians to openly declare the 
cosmopolitan ideal to be his in a famous speech held on 24 July 2008 where he introduced 
himself to the Berlin crowd as ‘a proud citizen of the United States, and a fellow citizen of 
the world’ (Mieder 2009, p. 121).  
 
Yet, our time is, on one hand, characterized by people's increasing eagerness to define 
themselves as citizens of the world and a widespread celebration of the melting pot ideal in 
the form of mixed-race identities, and, on the other hand, by a renewed sense of nationalism, 
a rising anxiety over immigrants and strengthening of borders. For instance, while a celebrity 
such as Tiger Woods starring on the Oprah Winfrey show publicly proclaims himself as 
‘Cablinasian’, i.e. simultaneously Caucasian, Black, Indian, and Asian, heart-aching reality 
shows such as U.S. Border Patrol feature on television worldwide how American volunteers, 
who regard every illegal immigrant as a drug dealer, sabotage water stations set up by 
humanitarian groups so that the Mexican immigrants trying to cross the border perish of 
                                                 
1This paper was derived from my MA thesis. 
 
 
 
 
 
2   Cosmopolitan Civil Societies Journal, Vol.3, No.3, 2011 
dehydration. Such inhumane acts lead to a series of questions: why do I have to embrace a 
special moral responsibility towards other people, for instance towards such destructive 
vigilante groups vandalizing water stations, for the sole reason that they, by accident, have 
the same nationality as I? Why should such people be free of any ethical sensibility towards 
others simply because they happened to be born on the other side of the national fence? As 
Ulrich Beck points out:  
 
What loses any legitimacy is the fundamentally dubious assumption that such responsibilities 
are absolute within a border, while their absence is equally absolute outside this border. This 
exclusion crisis sets off an avalanche of cosmopolitan questions: can the reasons which a 
society gives for the exclusion of strangers be questioned by members of this society and 
strangers alike? Who questions, who decides, who justifies and who defines who ‘who’ is? 
(Beck 2002, p. 36).  
The sense of threat felt by many in the U.S. is analogous to that which many Europeans feel 
pertaining to Islamic immigrants. For instance, in Switzerland, a country which prides itself 
on being one of the most globalized societies in the world and having cosmopolitan centres 
such as Zurich and Geneva, a constitutional amendment banning the construction of new 
minarets was approved in a November 2009 referendum. Is such denial of differences a 
retreat from cosmopolitanism? Absolutely, according to Stuart Hall, a cultural theorist and 
sociologist. He sees such policing of boundaries as an attempt to regulate cultural mixing and 
as a form of cultural fundamentalism, ‘a phenomenon by no means only restricted to a certain 
strand within political Islam’ but also ‘perfectly compatible with a certain version of western 
global modernity’ (Werbner 2008, p. 348).  
 
So where exactly does the notion of cosmopolitanism stand with respect to nationalism, 
multiculturalism, globalization, and so on and what are the reasons for the eagerness of many 
to embrace it, at least in theory, and of others to retreat from it, at least in practice?  
 
Defining Cosmopolitanism  
It has been argued that although cosmopolitanism appears to potentially serve as a think-
outside-the-box alternative to the nation-state paradigm, the only box it enables us to open is 
Pandora’s (Poulsen 2008). As Pollock, Bhabha, Breckenridge, and Chakrabarty eloquently 
put it:  
 
Cosmopolitanism may instead be a project whose conceptual content and pragmatic character 
are not only as yet unspecified but also must always escape positive and definite specification, 
precisely because specifying cosmopolitanism positively and definitely is an uncosmopolitan 
thing to do (Pollock et al. 2000, p. 577).  
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However, the claim that engagement in the act of defining cosmopolitanism ‘positively and 
definitely’ may constitute the obstruction of cosmopolitanism itself might just raise 
reasonable doubt in the mind of a reasonable person. Is there really something inherent in the 
act of defining that renders it an uncosmopolitan thing to do? In order to answer this question, 
one not only need to reflect upon whether such a characterization is valid but also reconsider 
what it means to define.  
 
One Cannot (Not) Define  
Defining cosmopolitanism is an uncosmopolitan thing to do. Defining democracy is an 
undemocratic thing to do. Really? Shall we define dubiousness then because it seems about 
the only indubious thing to do? Of course, one could accept the previously mentioned 
suggestion by Pollock et al. and hastily exclude any definitions as such on grounds of their 
exclusivistic or ‘illiberal’ tendencies but would that be more of a cosmopolitan thing to do?  
 
Firstly, the statement above by Pollock et al. seems rather trivial in that ‘the positive and 
definite specification’ of any term is an impossible task, in the realm of social sciences at 
least. This can be exemplified by means of a simple semantics drill involving several people 
drawing, for instance, a chair and comparing the result with one-another. Although the 
drawings expectedly vary depending on each individual’s perception of a chair based on 
previous experience with this or that specific chair, and it is impossible to arrive at one single 
positive and definite design for it, this does not necessarily imply a lack of agreement on 
what makes a chair a chair, i.e. on chairness so to speak. Secondly, this agreement can 
certainly be negotiated and altered over time. It goes without saying that the basic definition 
of a chair cannot and should not make finite a furniture designer’s creativity. On the contrary, 
a proper definition facilitates the familiar, without which novelty and creativity would not 
exist in the first place. In other words, although a definition of a chair influences the way we 
think about one, it poses no serious danger as designers and buyers do not build walls around 
their imagination by restricting it to the conventional model for a chair. Thirdly, there are 
different approaches to definition. While someone might define a chair by specifying its 
various parts, e.g. a seat, legs, back, and the material those parts consist of, someone else 
might take a functional approach to definition by indicating the purpose of a chair, i.e. that it 
is made for sitting or accommodating a person. While the first consists of countless more 
product specific, thus ephemeral ideas, the latter constitutes fewer more fundamental, thus 
longer-lasting and universal ones. However, at some point or another we have all heard of 
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how parliament members involved in brawls in countries such as India, Ukraine, South 
Korea, Taiwan etc., do not only fight for chairs but also with chairs. Needless to say, 
although, according to the most basic functional definition, a chair is made for sitting, it is 
ultimately up to individuals to decide what it is used as, whether it be a weapon, ladder, book 
shelf, footrest and so on. Defining, therefore, entails, to a great extent, an activity of choice.  
 
Clearly, ascribing the label uncosmopolitan to something inevitably implies that there must 
already exist an idea as to what constitutes the ‘cosmopolitan’. The bottom line is that 
definitions are as impossible as they are inevitable.  
 
A Definition of Definition 
The lay evaluations and stereotypical attitude towards definitions stem from the etymological 
origins of the term define, which comes from the Latin de finire, literally meaning both to 
terminate or end and to place within a boundary. Also, the Hebrew word for definition 
hagdara derives from the same root as the word for fence, gader. Hence, etymologically 
speaking, it is argued that to define means to establish boundaries, to finish, to locate, to 
isolate, to distinguish, to differentiate, to set apart, to limit, to dichotomize, etc.  
A person asked to define his position, in an argument, is being asked to remove ambiguities 
from a statement of it which, implicitly or explicitly, he is understood to have made, and thus 
make it clearer and more precise. A photographic image is said to be ill-defined when the 
degree of blurring is more than can reasonably be permitted. In these ordinary or common-
sense uses of the word, it is implied that definition is a matter of degree: to define is not to 
make absolutely definite what was absolutely indefinite, but to make more definite what was to 
some extent definite already (Collingwood 2005, p. 94).   
While, I am inclined to concur with Collingwood’s view above that definitions should not be 
seen as attempting to make definite the indefinite in absolute terms, rather in relative terms, 
as trying to make more definite the already somewhat definite, I am reluctant to concur with 
statements such as Oscar Wilde’s famous ‘to define is to limit’ (quoted in Cauti 2003, p. 
200). I choose not to view definitions in this light as I believe that we do not, and should not, 
limit concepts to their verbal counterparts. To define cannot be equated with to terminate or 
to end because, after all, it is impossible to ‘come to a point at which our knowledge 
concerning the essence of a concept could be described as complete’ (Collingwood 2005, p. 
97). Hence, I argue that a different understanding of the word define is required and I define 
my position by quoting the scholar Brian K. Smith:  
To define is not to finish, but to start. To define is not to confine but to create something to 
refine -and eventually redefine. To define, finally, is not to destroy but to construct for the 
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purpose of useful reflection... In fact, we have definitions, hazy and inarticulate as they might 
be, for every object about which we know something... Let us, then, define our concept of 
definition as a tentative classification of a phenomenon which allows us to begin an analysis of 
the phenomenon so defined (Smith 1989, pp. 4-5).  
Furthermore, based on the genus – differentia formula handed down to us from Aristotle, a 
definition is not only based on exclusion but also inclusion, on difference as well as 
sameness. According to this formula, definitions arise when characteristics perceived as 
common have been gathered and united into one nature or entity, which constitutes the genus. 
Then, differentia, i.e. a sort of particularity, is introduced in this perceived homogeneity. For 
instance, considering rational animal, a classical definition of man based on Aristotle’s 
statement that the human being has a rational principle, animal is the genus and rational is 
the differentia (Edel 1996, p. 91). Now, should we vilify this definition on grounds that it 
compels us to decide that humans are different from other animals, label that difference 
rationality, and conclude that, by definition, humans are rational and all other animals are 
not? The answer is no. Firstly, such a definition would immediately spark a debate that would 
hopefully lead to a new definition of man. Whether humans are distinguishable from animals 
by virtue of their rationality is entirely up for debate. Secondly, one can, in a democratic 
fashion, take the initiative to propose a different differentia, e.g. rationalizing rather than 
rational or capable of abstract thinking rather than linguistically capable, etc. Thirdly, 
instead of taking this definition at face value, deducing that it merely non-innocently 
dichotomizes rationality vs. animality or culture vs. nature, seeing it as a conspiracy to take 
whatever we deem as unworthy, in this case irrationality, and project it onto the other, i.e. 
animals, one is free to just as well focus on its inclusive drive in attributing membership. 
According to this definition, being human, first and foremost, means belonging to a single 
community, that of animals, which encloses humans. Thus, depending on how one 
approaches a definition, it can very well not only presuppose a positive outlook on difference 
but also a desire to create broad allegiances forming a universal solidarity. Therefore, it is not 
the act of defining per se which ought to be considered as inherently uncosmopolitan, rather 
our general attitude towards it as well as the way we might approach and interpret definitions. 
 
Given that a proper definition can promote a deeper understanding, improve communication 
and lead to a roadmap for further explanation, suggesting that defining is an uncosmopolitan 
thing to do is, in fact, doing justice to neither the concept of cosmopolitanism nor to that of 
definition. Is the glass half full or half empty? The choice is ours to make: we can either 
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exclude definitions for their alleged exclusivistic or illiberal tendencies or we can include 
them for their inclusivistic or liberal tendencies.  
 
A Cosmopolitan Approach to Definition  
Instead of conceptualizing a definition as trying to establish firm boundaries from which 
there is hardly an escape route, we can imagine it as consisting of two levels, the inner of 
which represents a single community of some agreed-upon fundamental characteristics of 
what is being defined. For instance, in the case of the chair one such characteristic deriving 
from its functional definition would be that a chair is intended for sitting. Even the members 
of parliament mentioned previously, who perhaps envisage a chair to be used for sleeping in, 
conquering or hitting each-other with, could hardly disagree with this universally 
acknowledged definition of a chair. The outer level, on the other hand, constitutes a myriad 
of personal extensions which are much more varied and culturally as well as individually 
determined. Both of these levels are shaped subjectively and are subject to negotiation and 
recalibration but whereas the inner level serves as a starting point to establishing 
understanding, requires a certain amount of consensus and is less disputable, the outer level 
encompasses each individual’s own version rooted in personal perceptions differing from the 
content of the universally recognized core. This model, thus, proposes constructing and 
perceiving definitions as composed of two layers, i.e. what is common and what is particular, 
convergence and divergence, sameness and difference, unity and diversity, the global and the 
local. Hence, contrary to the suggestion made by Pollock et al., definitions seen in this light 
reflect the core principle of cosmopolitanism, which is suggested in the following sections.  
 
A Cosmopolitan Approach to Cosmopolitanism  
In this section I dare take the risk of being charged with first-degree non-conformity to 
cosmopolitanism itself and endeavour to pin down its meaning, although the task is as 
simple as nailing the frothy bright pink concoction of vodka, triple sec, lime juice and a 
dash of cranberry to the wall. Before applying the previously proposed cosmopolitan 
approach to defining cosmopolitanism, the attention is turned to the nature of cosmos and 
polis as this might prove fundamental for a better conception of cosmopolitanism.  
 
 
The Cosmos and the Polis  
Of course, we all know how the luxury vacation ends for the girls that made popular the 
Cosmopolitan cocktail: In Sex and the City 2, Samantha has trouble controlling her urges and 
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is arrested for kissing someone in public in Abu Dhabi, in the movie at least; in reality the 
scenes were shot in Morocco because the government authorities in both Dubai and Abu 
Dhabi declined the request for filming based on moral objections to the film’s name.  
 
While much of human conduct is not regulated by law, public love-making undoubtedly is, 
not only in Abu Dhabi but in most contemporary cities and towns around the world. The 
prosecution of indecent public behaviour dates back to antiquity. The ancient Athenian 
society, for example, operated based on the politics of reputation, i.e. honour vs. shame, the 
politics of gender, i.e. male vs. female and the politics of spatial differentiation, i.e. public vs. 
private (Cohen 1991). Non-conformity to Athenian customs meant living life with shame and 
dishonour, which was commonly regarded as a fate worse than death – but it also meant 
living life as a citizen of the universe, i.e. as a kosmopolite. The word derives from the Greek 
cosmos (Κόσµος) denoting the universe and polis (Πόλις) the city. Such a kosmopolite was a 
woman named Hipparchia. She was an ancient female Greek philosopher who lived by the 
Cynic principle of parakrattein to nomismata, meaning to deface the currency. To deface in 
this metaphorical motto signifies changing the false values of the dominant culture, i.e. 
‘driving out the counterfeit coin of conventional wisdom’ (Branham and Goulet-Cazé 1996, 
p. 8). Initially adopted by Diogenes of Sinope, the man credited with the first known use of 
the word cosmopolitan, this Cynic principle of defacing the currency implied rejection of the 
prevailing social and political order in favour of an unconventional, self-sufficient life as a 
kosmopolite. Hipparchia fell in deeply love with Crates, a Cynic philosopher who had been a 
student of Diogenes of Sinope.  
Diogenes preached “cosmopolitanism,” declaring himself “without a city” (a-polis), “without a 
home” (a-oikos), and “citizen of the universe” (kosmopolites)… Diogenes urged people to 
abstain from all political engagement that, like family or social obligations, might constitute an 
obstacle to individual freedom (Branham and Goulet-Cazé 1996, p. 24).   
Hipparchia faced her parents’ objections by threatening to kill herself if she was not allowed 
to marry Crates. She changed the currency, thereby becoming a cosmopolite, by rejecting 
conventional materialism, embracing self-sufficiency and mental asperity. Most of our 
knowledge about Hipparchia and other Cynic philosophers comes from anecdotes and 
sayings reported by later authors such as Diogenes Laërtius and later Christian writers.  
 
Hipparchia was the first known woman Cynic. Choosing the manly life of the Cynic meant 
not only rejecting social institutions but also choosing hardship and poverty over material 
comfort. Cynics strived to live according to nature by rejecting artificial social conventions 
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and refusing all luxuries and any items not absolutely necessary for survival. They gave up 
their possessions, only wore a simple mantle, and begged on the streets. Furthermore, while 
women of Hipparchia’s social class were expected to be weaving and organizing the 
household servants, she defended the legitimacy of her presence at Greek symposiums 
traditionally attended only by men when this legitimacy was disparaged by other 
philosophers. Wearing the same mantle as Crates, typically male clothing, Hipparchia 
appeared with him in public everywhere, thus defying the tradition of keeping women 
sequestered at home. She upheld the Cynic value of anaideia, or shamelessness. She and 
Crates supposedly consummated their marriage by having sex on a public porch in broad 
daylight. Crates’ decision to marry is quite odd as marriage was a social institution of the sort 
normally rejected by Cynics. Earlier Cynics like Diogenes of Sinope had maintained that the 
philosopher would never marry. Crates is said to have called their marriage a cynogamy, 
meaning dog-coupling. In fact, the word Cynic itself derives from the Greek word kuon, or 
dog. This is why philosophers like Diogenes of Sinope, Crates and Hipparchia are also 
known as the Dog Philosophers. Aristotle, a contemporary of Diogenes, justified the label as 
follows:  
 
There are four reasons why the Cynics are so named. First because of the indifference of 
their way of life, for they make a cult of indifference and, like dogs, eat and make love in 
public, go barefoot, and sleep in tubs and at crossroads. The second reason is that the dog is 
a shameless animal, and they make a cult of shamelessness, not as being beneath modesty, 
but as superior to it. The third reason is that the dog is a good guard, and they guard the 
tenets of their philosophy. The fourth reason is that the dog is a discriminating animal 
which can distinguish between its friends and enemies. So do they recognize as friends 
those who are suited to philosophy, and receive them kindly, while those unfitted they drive 
away, like dogs, by barking at them (quoted in Navia 1996, p. 94).   
These philosophers obviously embraced this name designation as well as what it represented. 
Their willingness to accept this derogative term confirms that they upheld animals as models 
of life according to nature. The Cynics adopted unconventional positions also in religious 
terms. By living like dogs and following their natural inclinations so as to get in tune with the 
natural world order, they changed the status quo hierarchy animal-human-god to human-
animal-god. The human constituted the concrete model, whereas animal and god ‘the 
theoretical model of self-sufficiency and indifference, and consequently of happiness’ 
(Branham and Goulet-Cazé 1996, p. 24). This, however, did not mean that the Cynics were 
religious. In fact, they envied animals for not living in constant fear of the gods. Diogenes 
also defaced philosophy in that, not only did he prefer to live out his philosophical beliefs, 
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unlike other philosophers he criticized, but also in that he regarded philosophy outside our 
grasp.  
 
Just as Crates was influenced by his teacher Diogenes of Sinope, Hipparchia and Crates 
influenced their pupil Zeno of Citium, the founder of Stoicism in the early 3rd century BC. 
Zeno allowed the quenching of sexual desires even in public and advocated the equality of 
the genders, coeducational public exercise, and living according to nature in the sense of 
conforming one’s own reason to the dictates of the rational natural law. According to Stoic 
cosmopolitanism, all people are manifestations of the one universal spirit, ought to live in 
brotherly love and readily help one another.  The Stoic philosophy was geared towards 
helping anyone in need, regardless of gender, ethnicity, religion, and social status.  
 
What truly made the Stoic idea of offering help to any fellow human in need revolutionary 
was the fact that this help was extended to slaves, many of whom were brought in from 
conquests abroad. Even though in its early stages Stoic cosmopolitanism was chiefly a moral 
cosmopolitanism, political aspects still figured in as cosmopolitanism faced, right from the 
start, the conflict between idealism vs. pragmatism. Morality vs. the political practicality – 
one of the main problems surrounding contemporary notions of cosmopolitanism – was 
present right from the infancy of cosmopolitanism. Is loyalty and the feeling of mutual 
affinity greater within one’s own family, city, country than the loyalty to the world at large? 
Should help be offered by providing hospitality at home or by going abroad? Who is eligible 
for receiving help?  
 
The cosmopolitanism of the Stoics, which has been relayed and defended by Martha 
Nussbaum (1994) as a stance she urges we should adopt today, can be explicated by means of 
two metaphors put forth by Nussbaum. The first comes from the Roman Emperor Marcus 
Aurelius and involves a visualization of the entire world of human beings as the limbs of a 
collective humanity, and the second a picture of human interaction as a series of concentric 
circles. Although useful in facilitating imagination, both of these metaphors should raise 
some eyebrows. Conceiving of the entire world of human beings as one collective body and 
of people as its many limbs, would almost certainly lead to a conceptualization of certain 
individuals or groups as a cancer to this body of a collective humanity. Furthermore, the 
image of a series of concentric circles is also flawed. As Nussbaum relays, the circles 
represent the Stoic idea that one can be a citizen of the world without giving up local 
identifications and that instead of thinking of ourselves as devoid of local attachments, we 
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should think of ourselves as surrounded by a series of concentric circles and part of a greater 
whole. The individual draws the first circle around the self; the next around one’s immediate 
family; followed by the extended family; then one’s neighbours or local group, one’s fellow 
city-dwellers, one’s fellow countrymen and so on. The largest and outermost of all these 
circles is that of humanity as a whole. The citizens of the world must use reason to ‘draw the 
circles somehow toward the centre’, thus making all human beings more like their city co-
dwellers, connecting and harmonizing themselves with the ethics of all humanity (Hierocles 
quoted in Nussbaum 1994, p. 4). However, what if others do not wish to be made like our 
city co-dwellers? Besides, such a model of solidarity circles radiating outwards from the 
centre and becoming fainter with distance implies that humans feel stronger attachments to 
narrower circles, which must not necessarily be the case. The majority of Americans, for 
instance, would probably identify much more with the nation than any particular state. 
Likewise, there are also plenty of Swiss who feel greater solidarity with the nation of 
Switzerland rather than the particular canton they live in. 
 
Augustine of Hippo, a Latin-speaking philosopher very influential in the development of 
Western Christianity, took up Stoic cosmopolitanism but with a twist. The Christian cosmo-
polis was a community strictly for those who shared the belief in a Christian God. Christian 
cosmopolitanism, as such, was an exclusivist cosmopolitanism, if that is not too much of an 
oxymoron. Obviously, from its earliest beginnings, cosmopolitanism was confronted with 
one fundamental question: Can cosmopolitanism be extended so as to accommodate others 
who do not subscribe to its beliefs, whether they be Roman, Christian or Stoic?  
 
After having looked at the roots of the concept in ancient Greek thinking, some traces of 
which are still with us today, the attention is turned to cosmopolitanism as it was reinvented 
within the political philosophy of the Enlightenment, in particular the Kantian sense of 
cosmopolitanism which has had an enormous impact on the debate to date. According to 
Immanuel Kant, an 18th-century German philosopher, the natural state of humans is that of 
dog eat dog, of a war of all against all and it is man’s telos to free himself from this state of 
war. His Idea for a Universal History from a Cosmopolitan Point of View and Perpetual 
Peace basically represent an outline for the fulfilment of this telos and the realization of 
human perfection. Kant’s writings for a peaceful coexistence of human beings emerge from a 
period of a heavily war-torn Europe. To contextualize his writing one must keep in mind the 
(at that time) recent French Revolution, which Kant abhorred. Quite interestingly, in the 
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introductory paragraph of his 1795 essay entitled Perpetual Peace, a paragraph which could 
be described as a prophylactic disclaimer to protect himself from possible malevolent 
interpretations and backlash by the very statesmen under whose protection is writing, Kant 
assures that politicians must not fear his ideas and consequently demands of them to let him 
be:  
The practical politician assumes the attitude of looking down with great self-satisfaction on the 
political theorist as a pedant whose empty ideas in no way threaten the security of the state, 
inasmuch as the state must proceed on empirical principles; so the theorist is allowed to play 
his game without interference from the world-wise statesman (Kant 2007, p. 5).  
 
Furthermore, what makes this clausula salvatoria striking is the way Kant takes up the 
dichotomy between idealist and realist political philosophies by pitching the philosopher 
against the politician. This dichotomy, in turn, has perpetually become the centre of 
controversy revolving around the debate on cosmopolitanism between realist and 
idealist political philosophers. Kant’s apparent assertion that philosophical ideas exist so 
as to transcend the purely practical political concerns comes with a but:    
But if, in consequence of enlightened concepts of statecraft, the glory of the state is placed in 
its continual aggrandizement by whatever means, my conclusion will appear merely academic 
and pedantic (Kant 2007, p. 5).  
 
Kant bases his attempt to transcend the nation state on the uncommon assumption that 
the same rights that can be claimed by single individuals can also be claimed by nation 
states. The Golden Rule echoed in Kant’s essay forbids treating a human being as a 
means to an end because a rational human being is always an end in her/himself. It is 
along these lines that Kant argues that no nation state is allowed to simply take 
possession of another. This raises a question which plagues Kant’s entire essay, namely 
whether the analogy comparing nation states to reasonable beings themselves can be said 
to hold. One problem associated with this analogy is that one can politely or impolitely 
ask an individual to remove her/himself from the neighbourhood; a nation state, 
however, cannot do so, even though, according to Kant, every state as every individual is 
forced to expect the worst from the other. Kant lists a series of preconditions that must be 
satisfied, if perpetual peace is ever to exist. He puts forward the idea of acknowledging 
the absolute sovereignty of states and disapproves of all standing armies for having war 
as a purpose and for resulting in national debt, which, in turn, might serve as a pretext for 
further wars.  
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In Perpetual Peace Kant stages a cosmopolitan right as a guiding principle to protect 
people from war, and morally bases this cosmopolitan right on the principle of universal 
hospitality – thereby basically setting the ground for present-day asylum seekers. For 
Kant, if foreigners act in a peaceful manner, they are entitled the right to hospitality in a 
foreign country. In his own words:  
 
Hospitality means the right of a stranger not to be treated as an enemy when he arrives in the 
land of another. One may refuse to receive him when this can be done without causing his 
destruction; but, so long as he peacefully occupies his place, one may not treat him with 
hostility. It is not the right to be a permanent visitor that one may demand. A special beneficent 
agreement would be needed in order to give an outsider a right to become a fellow inhabitant 
for a certain length of time. It is only a right of temporary sojourn, a right to associate, which all 
men have. They have it by virtue of their common possession of the surface of the earth, where, 
as a globe, they cannot infinitely disperse and hence must finally tolerate the presence of each 
other. Originally, no one had more right than another to a particular part of the earth (Kant 
2007, p. 21).  
 
Kant’s hospitality grants a stranger the right to temporarily stay within a certain territory 
without, however, enjoying the same rights that its citizens do. Apart from its communist 
overtone, the ‘common possession of the surface of the earth’ is also reminiscent of the 
Stoics. 
 
Kant compares nation states to savages subject to an existence characterized by senseless and 
lawless freedom. This, he argues, is a state that can be overcome by pursuing a more rational 
and regulated freedom through the establishment of a League of Nations. In his 1784 essay 
translated to English as Idea for a Universal History from a Cosmopolitan Point of View, 
Kant presents history as gradually progressing towards a particular end point, i.e. towards a 
state of human perfection. This end of the road perfect state for Kant is cosmopolitanism, the 
League of Nations, the fulfilment of humanity’s telos. Humanity progresses towards this 
point as a result of sheer necessity and antagonism. By antagonism Kant means, ‘the unsocial 
sociability of men, i.e., their propensity to enter into society, bound together with a mutual 
opposition which constantly threatens to break up the society’ (Kant 1963, p. 15). Nations, 
according to Kant, driven by necessity and antagonisms, will progress towards ‘a distant 
international government’ whose end point is a ‘universal cosmopolitan condition’ (Kant 
1963, p. 23). He himself, however, admits ‘that with such an Idea’ structuring his master 
narrative ‘only a romance could be written’ (Kant 1963, p. 24).  
 
Kant’s view of a teleologically unfolding history moving towards cosmopolitanism not only 
suggests that even for Kant cosmopolitanism constitutes a millennial concept but also begs 
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the question: without any further obstacles and antagonisms to overcome, will humanity 
simply become slothful? Kant’s cosmopolitan (hi)story can be seen as an endeavour on his 
part to fulfil a sort of romantic longing by bringing sense to a seemingly senseless history.  
 
Despite the attractiveness of 18th century cosmopolitan ideals, nationalism and 
internationalism became the dominant ideas in the modern world and cosmopolitanism came 
to be associated with those who were stateless or not committed to the national project, e.g. 
the Jews and the aristocracy, respectively. However, prompted by a growing awareness of 
globalization, cosmopolitanism has once again stolen the spotlight and Kant’s political 
writings serve as the main source of inspiration for contemporary cosmopolitan theory.  
 
The General: A Contemporary Blueprint  
While we would agree that the shameless actions of the self-proclaimed Hellenistic 
cosmopolites would probably, even from our contemporary perspective, constitute public 
indecency, we are aware that no definition of public indecency covers all the possible 
circumstances that such a term might cover. Lawmakers, for example, cannot be expected to 
be able to foresee all the ways in which it is possible to commit public indecency. Courts of 
law continuously refine the meaning of the term as new cases occur; they diminish the 
vagueness and their decisions become precedents for future reference. Even established terms 
need improving and refining and perhaps even reinventing. What makes cosmopolitanism 
such a term in desperate need of refinement is especially suggestions like the one below by 
Pollock, Bhabha, Breckenridge, and Chakrabarty:   [W]e already are and have always been cosmopolitan, though we may not always have known 
it. Cosmopolitanism is not just—or perhaps not at all—an idea. Cosmopolitanism is infinite 
ways of being (Pollock et al. 2000, p. 588).   
This seems like a philosophical dead-end: A tree falls in the forest; no one is there to hear it; 
does it make a sound? Likewise, someone is cosmopolitan by default; they do not know they 
are; are they cosmopolitan? Would it not make more sense to conceptualize cosmopolitanism 
as performative, i.e. in terms of ways of doing, rather than ways of being? Cosmopolitan is 
not something one is, rather something one does. How exactly can one do cosmopolitanism? 
While it is impossible to foresee all the ways in which it is possible to do cosmopolitanism, 
one fundamental way that has stood the test of time certainly seems to involve defacing the 
currency, i.e. defying what is taken for granted. In the vein of Cynic philosophy, defacing the 
currency was an individual attitude and discipline. As Martha Nussbaum points out:  
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Becoming a citizen of the world is often a lonely business. It is, in effect, as Diogenes said, a 
kind of exile – from the comfort of local truths, from the warm nestling feeling of patriotism, 
from the absorbing drama of pride in oneself and one’s own (Nussbaum 1994, p. 6).  
This may still hold true in a present-day world in which cosmopolitanism stands for political 
protest rather than individual lifestyle. Incorporating cosmopolitan perspectives into 
national and local political affairs does seem, as a matter of fact, to be a lonely business. In 
Ronald Stade’s words:   
Fighting for a global constitution and rule of law, to many may appear as tilting at windmills. 
Here, however, we can learn from Diogenes of Sinope, Crates and Hipparchia, and all the 
other shameless Dogs. Although cosmopolitanism no longer is about personal salvation or 
becoming godlike, it continues to defy much of what is taken for granted. It is still about 
parakratein to nomismata, “defacing the currency” (Stade 2007, p. 12).  
 
This defacing of the currency can occur across various dimensions of cosmopolitanism, i.e. 
political, cultural, and moral. For example, Chris Brown, an international relations theorist, 
defines cosmopolitanism along its political dimension as ‘the refusal to regard existing 
political structures as the source of ultimate value’ (1992, p. 24). This definition has become 
wider for many so as to encompass open-ended trans-national and supranational projects as 
well as seeking a trans-ethnic community within the boundaries of a particular nation state. In 
the contemporary context and along its cultural dimension, as Waldron underlines, 
cosmopolitanism means:  
[T]he ability to stand outside of having one’s life written and scripted by any one community, 
whether that is a community of faith or tradition or religion or culture … and draw selectively 
on a variety of meanings (quoted in Vertovec and Cohen 2002, p. 4).  
 
Alternatively, cultural cosmopolitanism has been said to emphasize ‘the value of global 
cultural pluralism’ (Kleingeld 1999, p. 506). While Waldron seems to make a valid point, 
Kleingeld’s view appears somewhat muddied as cultural pluralism can be differentiated from 
cosmopolitanism. This distinction is made in a subsequent section of the paper. Finally, along 
the moral dimension, cosmopolitanism is generally grounded in characteristics universally 
shared among humans (and sometimes other kinds of beings). For Aristotle in 350 BC this 
shared characteristic was a telos (Edel 1996, p. 62), for Kant in 1795 it was reason (Kant 
2007, p. 45), for Bentham in 1780 it was the capability to suffer (Bentham 2008, p. 20). 
Lévinas in 1961, on the other hand, based his ethics not on what humans share, rather on 
otherness (Lévinas 1991, pg. 16). The previously mentioned notion of hospitality put forth by 
Kant can serve as an example of ‘an obligation established by universal human reason which 
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is morally legislative’ (Kant 2007, p. 45). Every stranger, he argues, has the cosmopolitan 
right not to be treated as an enemy upon arrival in the land of another (Kant 2007, p. 21). 
Providing this hospitality constitutes a moral obligation.  
 
Contemporary cosmopolitanism seems to have been turned into a collective ethical as well as 
institutional project. The changes of the last two millennia have enabled cosmopolitanism to 
shift from the private to the public sphere, i.e. from individual struggle to institutional 
configuration. Such institutions designed to embody the ideal of cosmopolitanism can be 
exemplified by: the humanitarian institution of the International Committee of the Red Cross 
founded in 1863 to protect human life and health and alleviate human suffering without 
discrimination based on nationality, race, gender, class, etc.; the International Criminal Police 
Organization established in 1923 to ensure public safety, fight terrorism, crimes against 
humanity, environmental crimes, etc; the World Bank established in 1944 to provide low-
interest, interest-free loans, and grants to developing countries in an aim to reduce poverty; 
the League of Nations which was created in 1919 to maintain world peace and was eventually 
replaced by the United Nations after the end of World War II in 1945; the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization founded in 1949 and committed to a strong and productive cooperation 
with the UN; the European Union, an economic and political union of sovereign nation states 
also established in the aftermath of World War II known to operate through supranational 
independent institutions; and even the fictional United Federation of Planets in Star Trek – 
apparently upholding the values of universal liberty, equality, justice, cooperation, and peace. 
If the abolition of war is a prerequisite for a peaceful co-existence, should this prerequisite be 
fulfilled by establishing a single universal authority such as an all-powerful United Nations or 
by abolishing nation states altogether since it is nations that wage wars against one-another? 
In the vein of Kantian cosmopolitanism, if there ever will exist a cosmopolis, which 
institutional state form will it take and will the nation be left behind?  
 
Not necessarily. In view of contemporary cosmopolitan theory, cosmopolitanism does not 
mean that the nation is no longer a politically relevant community. Delanty argues that 
‘cosmopolitan refers to the end of the “closed society” of the nation-state, but does not spell 
the end of the nation’ (2008, p. 220). The post-universal cosmopolitanism that he proposes ‘is 
critical and dialogic, seeing as the goal alternative readings of history and the recognition of 
plurality rather than the creation of a universal order, such as a cosmopolis’ (Delanty 2006, p. 
35). Quite interestingly, even contemporary notions of cosmopolitanism bear resemblance to 
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the Cynic philosophy of defacing the currency. Delanty not only argues, for example, that 
‘cosmopolitanism must be seen as one of the major expressions of the tendency in modernity 
towards self-problematization,’ but also endeavours to defy some usually taken for granted 
pitfalls of cosmopolitanism such as Eurocentrism, universalism and relativism (2006, p. 35). 
It is precisely this ‘condition of self-problematization’ and ‘self-scrutinization’ that, in his 
view, characterizes ‘the cosmopolitan imagination’ (2006, p. 25). Therefore, along these 
lines, cosmopolitanism in practice involves not only defacing the currency, i.e. rejecting the 
dominant status quo, but also defacing one’s own currency as well as its own currency, i.e. 
the currency of the self and of itself.  
 
Clearly, whether the discussion is anchored in individual approaches or around institutional 
implications, the principle of defacing the currency, implying a rejection of the prevailing 
status quo in favour of a new cosmopolitan vision, seems to underlie every dimension of 
cosmopolitanism.  
 
The Particular: Personal Extensions  
Much to the dismay of Toby Cecchini’s (2004), who standardized the method for preparing 
the Cosmopolitan using Cointreau and freshly-squeezed lime juice, there are as many 
versions of the cocktail as there exist bartenders in the world. Similarly, there might be as 
many cosmopolitanisms as there are individuals claiming cosmopolitanism. Each flavour of 
the notion is rooted in each person’s own local discourse.  
 
My personal concoction includes a willingness to educate and commit myself to global issues 
such as the environment, a feeling of being at ease with more than one cultural setting, not so 
much the willingness to listen to the voice of experience, rather to have the courage to be the 
voice of experience myself. Another key ingredient is the flexibility in appropriating cultural 
forms or practices from elsewhere without the fear of this jeopardizing my identity.  
 
Cosmopolitanism in practice, the way I understand it, does not involve loudly proclaiming 
oneself as a proud teenage lesbian or as a proud Kosovo Albanian or as a British celebrating a 
Swedish sofa or even as a cosmopolitan. Rather, cosmopolitanism can be conceptualized as a 
kind of performative practice through which one (as well as cosmopolitanism itself) avoids 
being branded. It involves resisting the notion that one’s identity is determined by brands. 
However, considering that ‘we live in a society where youth recognize 1,000 corporate logos 
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and fewer than 10 species of wildlife found in their communities’ (Bateman 2008), even this 
notion of cosmopolitanism seems overly optimistic.  
 
The most important ingredient in my cosmopolitan concoction is love. However, this love 
does not only extend to my fellow human co-dwellers in the world as Martha Nussbaum 
(1994) suggests but also to all other living creatures. Moreover, doing cosmopolitanism 
means being as loyal to any nation as I am to any brand. In tune with the marketing saying, 
‘there are no more customers, only prospects’ (quoted in Kataras 2008, p. 35), I consider 
myself a prospect rather than a citizen of any country. Nevertheless, I try to remain attentive 
to the social conditions and the situations of those who do not share my privileges of 
transcending national identities.  
 
Cosmopolitanism has meaning beyond the weakly translated world-citizenship and that a 
theory enabling a deep conception of the cosmos, polis and their harmonization has yet to 
come. In the meantime, cosmopolitanism, nonetheless, encourages us to rethink the relation 
between the self, community, and the world. It is important for us to think about how we 
concoct our cosmopolitanisms and what we do with them so that we can do cosmopolitanism 
not only intuitively as suggested by Pollock et al. but also by conscious commitment.  
 
Mutual Affinity  
Cosmopolitanism, as it is widely understood today, contends that solidarities among people 
should be built based on a shared humanity. Cosmopolitanism is often equated to 
universalism, which is also potentially global or transnational in scope. In universalist terms 
people are united by virtue of a common adherence to a set of universally applicable ideals 
such as a liberal democratic creed, religion, etc., regardless of national or cultural divides. 
These ideas and values are, thus, capable of transcending territorial or cultural boundaries. 
Universalist solidarity is grounded on a shared ideology and extends to anyone who commits 
and shows loyalty to the ideology. An example would be the world-wide coalition against a 
common enemy such as Al-Qaeda. Universalists, however, differ from cosmopolitans in that 
cosmopolitans do not require others to identify with a particular set of ideas, such as political 
beliefs and cultural values, as a precondition for mutual affinity. The line is still somewhat 
blurry though because humanity is itself an idea, but cosmopolitanism, even more so than 
universalism, values cultural diversity as a defining trait of humanity and is more insistent on 
preserving that diversity. From a cosmopolitan point of view, unity is not the same as 
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uniformity and diversity is not the problem, rather the solution. Diversity in sameness is the 
tenet of the European Union. For universalists, on the other hand, a common identity requires 
a common and homogeneous worldview. An argument made against universalism by 
postmodern scholars such as Jennifer Hochschild (1984) is that when it comes to shared 
ideologies, the global is too global, i.e. no creed is universalizable, although we would like to 
think otherwise. Values and ideas are at least partially predicated on the culture and linguistic 
tradition from within which they originate. Universalism is not only believed by many to be 
practically impossible but also undesirable.  
 
Coexistent with cosmopolitanism, hardly the dominant conception of belonging, and 
universalism, which extends solidarity to anyone adhering to a common set of ideas, are at 
least two other popular traditions, namely nationalism and multiculturalism. Nationalism 
identifies the members of a nation as a united and distinct people and restricts solidarity to 
that narrow circle. As defined by Anthony Smith, the ‘core doctrine’ of nationalism maintains 
that ‘the world is divided into nations, each with its own character, history and destiny’ 
(2004, p. 245) and that ‘an individual’s primary loyalty must be to her or his nation’ (1991, p. 
74). Nationalism is considered dangerous because it heavily relies on the principle of 
exclusion. National solidarity is the public spirit that stops at the national borders, i.e. a 
feeling of mutual affinity that binds all the fellow citizens of a nation but does not extend to 
other nations. This solidarity is grounded in a common national identity built around so-
perceived exceptional characteristics or shared particularities which are associated with the 
whole nation, used to characterize it, to distinguish and separate it from other nations. In 
other words, these exceptional characteristics are shared by the members of a nation alone. 
These shared characteristics are perceived to involve race, religious heritage, language, 
national history, cultural symbols and traditions, a set of political institutions and so on. As 
Smith points out, however, a nation’s distinguishing characteristics that unite all its members 
while simultaneously severing them from non-members boil down to the ‘common myths 
and memories,’ the ‘distinctive public culture,’ the ‘historic homeland,’ the ‘common laws 
and customs.’ In his own words, the nation is:  
 
a named and self-defined community whose members cultivate common myths, memories, 
symbols and values, possess and disseminate a distinctive public culture, reside in and identify 
with a historic homeland, and create and disseminate common laws and shared customs (2005, 
p. 98).  
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Nationalism, thus, contends that the members of a nation share important characteristics 
which can serve as a basis for solidarity limited by territorial boundaries as well as ethno-
cultural divisions. This is in contrast to the multi-culturalist or the culturally pluralist tradition 
which dismisses national identities as not only artificial but also spiritually meaningless. This 
tradition favours more localized and narrower attachments such as regional or state 
communities, particular interest groups and so on. Pluralism characterizes the nation as a 
disunited mishmash and, to a certain extent, it ignores the tensions that arise and denies the 
need for solidarity altogether, i.e. multiple cultures can coexist without blending. The 
majority of cultural pluralists believe in the coexistence of multiple groups under the same 
political roof, without the need for a strong common bond. Underlying pluralism is the notion 
that we can only feel attachment to a part of the whole, rather than the whole itself. One 
important implication is that it is not particularity per se, rather one’s status as a marginalized 
minority that moves to the foreground. For instance, Judith Butler is a lesbian rather than 
Jewish; Barack Obama is black, not Christian; we are aware of Hillary Clinton’s gender.  
 
There has been a rather recent wave of right-wing conservative nationalism in Switzerland, 
which arose in part in response to the popularity of multi-culturalism and interest-group 
liberalism, which is perceived to pose a threat to national unity. For the Swiss, posters such as 
the following distributed by SVP, the Swiss People's Party, have become all too familiar: 
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The figure illustrates some of the billboards mushrooming all over Switzerland in recent 
years. They are propagated by the SVP, known for its adherence to national conservatism, its 
commitment to reducing immigration inflow, rejection of increases in government spending 
on social welfare and education, its opposition to closer ties with the NATO and to increased 
involvement of Switzerland in supranational organizations such as the UN, EU, etc. The 
posters portray Switzerland as being pierced by minarets which look like missiles; a flag 
being stepped on by the black feet of immigrant masses; a tiny Switzerland being chewed up 
by big, black crows; many coloured hands each trying to grab a Swiss passport, and, of 
course, the black sheep being kicked out by the white ones. Each poster, as fear-instilling and 
discriminatory as it might seem, is actually associated with the proposal of a new law. For 
example, as mentioned in the introduction to this paper, in November of 2009, in an act of 
direct democracy, a ban on the construction of minarets, proposed by SVP members, was 
approved by the majority of voters (57.5%) and became an amendment to the Swiss 
Constitution.  
 
A multi-lingual and multi-ethnic country such as Switzerland, where the World Economic 
Forum takes place and where a number of international organizations are headquartered due 
to the fact that it is considered a so-called neutral country, seems anything but neutral in light 
of such images.  
 
Cosmopolitan solidarity is advantageous, in that it attempts to reconcile the dilemma between 
the inevitable presence of social diversity and the sense of homogeneity necessary for 
societies to remain united and free. Cosmopolitanism does not deny diversity, rather affirms 
it. Clearly, although conservative nationalists may argue otherwise, no nation has ever been 
homogeneous. Multi-culturalism and pluralism may be new words but not new trends. All 
nations put under the test of distinct national character would most probably fall through due 
to a lack of homogeneity necessary to unite them, whether this homogeneity be territorial, 
linguistic, cultural, political or religious. Cosmopolitan solidarity, thus, appeals to a category 
which is higher, more abstract, idealistic and broad so as to encompass all humans. 
Cosmopolitanism provides a sense of universal human solidarity as a direct consequence of 
diversity rather than in spite of it. If we accept the premise that a community cannot survive 
free and independent unless its members feel some attachment to the whole, then 
cosmopolitanism seems to make more sense than pluralism, which promotes narrow factional 
interests and separate cultural traditions. Even if we accept the apparent inescapability of 
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pluralism, the extent to which we define ourselves in opposition to the whole based our 
distinctive characteristics, this does not rule out the possibility of a shared human identity. 
Humanity can still be conceived of as distinct within a larger universal collective or whole of 
creatures and beings, i.e. that which is human as opposed to that which is not.  
 
Ethnogamy: It Is All in the Mix  
‘Like any shaken drink, the Cosmopolitan wants to be brutalized. There should be aeration, 
collision and dilution galore going on in that shaker,’ says Toby Cecchini, the New York 
bartender (2008). One takes a sip and surprise, surprise, the ingredient of individuality is not 
lost, rather strengthened! One can still taste the triple sec made from sun-dried peels of bitter 
Caribbean oranges. That tiny dash of cranberry now sweeps over the tongue like a giant wave 
of freshness. Would lime juice even taste as good, if it were not fused in this particular 
citrusy sweet mixture?  
 
Cultures too, are fluids that are inevitably mixed. Culture is a fluid process. As Delanty 
points out:  
 
It is possible to see cosmopolitanism expressed in the mixing and re-packaging of cultures and 
identities. This might be a weak expression of cosmopolitanism but, depending on the degree 
of self-transformation that results, it may also take a stronger form (2008, pp. 219-220).  
 
Short or long? Weak or strong? The quick fix is all in the mix! Toby Cecchini could have 
told us that much.   
 
Obviously, thinking of culture in a nationalist framework is absurd because culture has 
always been fluctuating. There exists no single authentic culture. Even Native American 
jewellery, which is commonly perceived as authentic, for instance, was heavily influenced by 
Spanish jewellery. Cultures have always been cross-fertilized and influenced by others. Of 
course, it may be hard for some people to accept that another culture has fertilized theirs 
because they can then no longer claim superiority over the other culture, if they indebt their 
own culture to the other. For this reason, colonizers could not admit that the colonized 
countries had fertilized their own culture. They projected upon the colonized what was other 
in themselves, while denying any sameness that the colonized shared with them.  
 
Given the heightened awareness that it is only one’s projection onto the Other that makes it 
other than oneself, forming our cultural identities by excluding what we are not because the 
rest constitutes what we are seems like an ultimately unrewarding form of imprisonment. 
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Thus, it becomes increasingly difficult to buy into the argument that solidarity requires an 
Other, an excluded them against whom we can define us and that ‘collective identities can 
only be established on the mode of an us/them’ (Mouffe 2000, p. 13).  
 
Cosmopolitanism involves defining oneself with another, not against another. In doing so, we 
can reach a far more profound sense of definition as expression of meaning. We must define 
ourselves and our cultures not based on negation and mutual exclusion but through 
affirmation and mutual recognition, i.e. as contained in one-another. Since cultures are 
dependent on one-another, we have the makings of a marriage. Hence, instead of viewing 
cultures, in a romanticized nationalist light, as distinct from one another, I propose the term 
ethnogamy to denote the process by which contemporary cultures become cosmopolitan. 
Ethnogamy stems from the union of the Greek ethnos (ἔθνος), meaning nation or cultural 
group, and gamos (γάµος), meaning marriage or union. We should by all means not limit this 
union to only two cultures. However, Ulrich Beck’s description is useful in triggering the 
imagination as to when a couple is considered a couple:  
 
The French sociologist Jean-Claude Kaufmann (1994) has a very sophisticated answer: a 
couple is not formed when two people start living together, or when they start having sex. 
Something else must be added: a couple begins when two persons buy one washing machine – 
not two! Why? Because then the quarrels about ‘Dirty Laundry’ (the title of his marvelous 
book) start. Who washes for whom? What counts as dirty? What as clean? What happens in 
each case, if he says yes and she says no? (Beck 2002, p. 25).  
 
Ethnogamy emphasizes the fundamental need for unity, collective decision-making and 
reflection on a shared collective future. Multi-culturalism, the extent to which we define 
ourselves in opposition to the whole, on the basis of our distinctive traits, poses a serious 
challenge to the very notion of cosmopolitanism itself, which demands solidarity and 
bonding. This feeling of cosmopolitan mutual affinity can better be established by allowing 
newcomers to mix their own cultural practices into the melting pot, rather than requiring a 
complete assimilation on their part into the pre-existing host culture, i.e. integration by means 
of eliminating difference. Like a good Cosmopolitan cocktail, the multi-ethnic melting pot 
needs to be shaken and brutalized until it takes the form of an ethnogamy.  
 
Cosmopoliteness   
Politeness lies within the same semantic field as cosmopolitanism. Politeness stems from the 
Latin polīre (to polish) and means polishedness, which refers to another word in this semantic 
field, urbanity. In Latin the word originally referred to a mentality and a behaviour which one 
 
 
 
Cosmopolitan Civil Societies Journal, Vol.3, No.3, 2011      23 
ought to have in the urbs (the city) of ancient Rome. The fact that, in just three steps, almost 
any dictionary will take one from polite to urbane to cosmopolitan speaks to the relatedness 
of these notions.  
 
Politeness as a facilitator of sociability is an essential aspect of public and private everyday 
culture, of business and of diplomacy. Kant’s roadmap to cosmopolitanism involves 
transcending antagonisms among individuals and nation states alike. He refers to these 
antagonisms as ‘the unsocial sociability of men, i.e., their propensity to enter into society, 
bound together with a mutual opposition which constantly threatens to break up the society’ 
(Kant 1963, p. 15). Since social sociability seems to be a fundamental feature of 
cosmopolitanism, it seems reasonable that one of cosmopolitanism’s theoretical backdrops be 
relational work, particularly politeness theory. It is important to point out with Brown and 
Levinson (1987) that politeness allows communication to take place between potentially 
aggressive partners, which make politeness theory relevant in the realm of cosmopolitan 
theory. In Kant’s (2007) view mentioned previously in the paper, not only individuals but 
also nations states are, by default, potentially aggressive partners.  
 
The notions of politic and (im)polite behavior along the lines proposed by Richard Watts, a 
key figure in politeness theory, are as follows: 
 
[L]inguistic behaviour which is perceived to be appropriate to the social constraints of the on-
going interaction, i.e. as non-salient, should be called politic behaviour. … Linguistic 
behaviour which is perceived to be beyond what is expectable, i.e. salient behaviour, should be 
called polite or impolite depending on whether the behaviour itself tends towards the negative 
or positive end of the spectrum of politeness (Watts 2003, p. 19).  
 
Rather than restricting these notions to linguistic behaviour, we can attempt to apply them to 
behaviour in general. For instance, the actions of Hellenistic cosmopolites could be 
considered as cosmoimpolite. Laërtius (1853, p.233) tells us that Diogenes of Sinope pointed 
at people with his middle finger. He is also said to have defecated in the theatre, urinated on 
some people who insulted him, dropped by at people’s houses unannounced to offer them 
advice, strolled the streets in full daylight with a lamp saying that he was just looking for an 
honest man, etc. Like dogs, the Dog Philosophers ate and made love in public, went barefoot, 
and slept in tubs and at crossroads. What makes their actions cosmoimpolite is not the fact 
that they violated what was considered socially appropriate behaviour because, as previously 
established, defacing the currency is one key underlying principle of cosmopolitanism. 
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Rather, the fact that this defacing led to conflict, thus disrupting their peaceful co-existence in 
their communities.  
 
Cosmopolitic could perhaps characterize the perspective of the dominant capitalist 
bourgeoisie whose global reach and its modes of production were bound to equalize the 
differences between nations as described by Marx and Engels in The Communist Manifesto 
written fifty-three years after Kant’s Perpetual Peace. Moreover, it might be used to describe 
what Frantz Fanon called a ‘profoundly cosmopolitan mould’ (Fanon 1961, p. 149) in The 
Wretched of the Earth. According to Fanon, this formerly colonized bourgeoisie was 
dominated by capitalist interests. Moreover, these puppets and imitators of the colonizers, 
while intent on keeping the peace, tended towards mediocrity as they lacked the spirit of 
initiative. They, therefore, did not deface but endorse the currency.  
 
Cosmopolite, on the other hand, could be used to imply a harmonious defacement of the 
currency. The actions of Immanuel Kant might, for instance, provide an illustration. Kant, a 
visionary with dreams global in size, in the midst of a heavily war-torn Europe, wrote for a 
peaceful coexistence of human beings. He reinvented cosmopolitanism, thus defacing its 
currency. He took a revolutionary stance but in a peaceful manner by politely flattering the 
statesmen whom he obviously depended on to carry out his work. He referred to politicians 
as ‘world-wise statesmen’ and to his own thoughts as ‘empty ideas’ (Kant 2007, p. 5). He 
practised the peace he preached and seemed willing to accommodate others (the ‘world-wise 
statesmen’) who did not necessarily subscribe to his cosmopolitan vision.  
 
Cosmopoliteness can, therefore, serve as an umbrella term encompassing cosmopolitic and 
cosmo(im)polite behaviour. Such a model is not meant for sorting cosmopolitans into 
different types or for branding behaviour, rather for the purpose of facilitating useful 
reflection so as to spark a debate leading to a deeper understanding.  
 
Conclusion  
In the same way that Cynicism became the popular philosophy of antiquity as it was no 
longer reserved for a social or intellectual elite and everyone could philosophize, 
cosmopolitanism, too, is on its way to become the popular philosophy of our time. As Kant’s 
‘empty ideas’ fill up with actions, so does the cosmopolitan glass. We are faced with a 
plethora of definitions of cosmopolitanism. While these definitions should by no means be 
received uncritically, they should also not be viewed as interfering with cosmopolitanism’s 
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process of becoming, rather as assisting that process.  
 
The cosmopolitan approach to cosmopolitanism proposed here involves filling the glass with 
both: sameness and difference, the general and the particular, genus and differentia, 
respectively. In order to establish some sort of general blueprint for cosmopolitanism, a 
functional approach is taken in that the main question is not what, rather why, 
cosmopolitanism is. Its trajectory starting off with the Cynics and the Stoics via Immanuel 
Kant to the present suggests that cosmopolitanism serves as a conceptual tool for defacing the 
currency. This genus is mixed and shaken together with the differentia, i.e. the 
conceptualization of cosmopolitanism as a kind of performative practice through which 
branding can be dodged.  
 
This paper did not set out to toss a definition of cosmopolitanism at the reader right from the 
start, rather to stir the imagination and prompt one to concoct one’s own working definition 
post-analysis so as to facilitate a conceptualization of cosmopolitanism as a performative 
practice. How do people, cultures, countries, the world – how do I – do cosmopolitanism? 
Perhaps one day the pipe dream(s) of the cosmopolitan project(s) will become reality and will 
not only stand the test of time but also have in store great rewards for humanity. Until then, 
we should not be arguing if the cosmopolitan glass is half empty or half full but rather ask 
ourselves what we can do with what is in the glass. Bottoms up!  
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